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We provide a security analysis for continuous variable quantum key distribution protocols based
on the transmission of two-mode squeezed vacuum states measured via homodyne detection. We
employ a version of the entropic uncertainty relation for smooth entropies to give a lower bound on
the number of secret bits which can be extracted from a finite number of runs of the protocol. This
bound is valid under general coherent attacks, and gives rise to keys which are composably secure.
For comparison, we also give a lower bound valid under the assumption of collective attacks. For
both scenarios, we find positive key rates using experimental parameters reachable today.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the first
ideas from quantum information theory for turning quan-
tum paradoxes into applications, see [1] and references
therein. The task in QKD is to generate a shared key,
secret from any eavesdropper (Eve), between two distant
parties (Alice and Bob) using communication over a pub-
lic quantum channel and an authenticated classical chan-
nel. Many different implementations of QKD have been
proposed, each one with individual strengths and weak-
nesses. Early proposals are based on exchanging qubits,
and are part of the family of discrete variable (DV) QKD
protocols. Continuous variable (CV) protocols have later
been proposed and offer the possibility to use standard
telecom technologies (see [2] and references therein), in
particular, they do not require photon counters.
A generic QKD protocol starts with the distribution of,
say, N quantum states between the honest parties which
are then measured according to the rules of the protocol.
A certain part of the measurement outcomes is then used
to estimate Eve’s information about the remaining data
from which a key of length ` is generated by classical post-
processing. The goal of a finite-key security analysis is
to prove that the key is secure against any wiretapping
strategy of Eve, up to a small failure probability. This
is in contrast to the study of asymptotic rates in which
perfect security in the limit forN to infinity is considered.
Eve’s knowledge can be bounded by the probabil-
ity that she correctly guesses Alice’s measurement out-
comes. This is expressed by the conditional smooth min-
entropy [3] of the data from which the key is generated
given Eve’s quantum system. This ensures composable
security [4], i.e., the protocol can securely be combined
with other composeably secure cryptographic protocols.
Since the actual state is not known, the smooth min-
entropy has to be bounded for the worst case compatible
with the observed measurement data. This is in general a
hard task and often simplified by additional assumptions
about the power of the eavesdropper. Instead of allowing
the most general, coherent attack on the quantum com-
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munication between Alice and Bob, the eavesdropper is
often restricted to collective attacks, meaning that ev-
ery signal is attacked with the same quantum operation.
Under this assumption, Alice and Bob can employ state
tomography to bound Eve’s information and to ensure
security. In the case of DV QKD, these security proofs
can then often be lifted to security proofs against coher-
ent attacks using the exponential de Finetti theorems [5]
or the post-selection technique [6].
Most security analysis for CV protocols neglect finite-
key effects and consider asymptotic rates by using the
Devetak-Winter formula [7](see [8] for an infinite di-
mensional version). We are only aware of [9], where
a first finite-key analysis for specific protocols under
the assumption of collective Gaussian attacks was pro-
vided. Security against coherent attacks was consid-
ered in [10, 11] based on entanglement purification pro-
tocols, but without a quantitive analysis. The transfer
of the exponential de Finetti technique to the infinite-
dimensional setting is very subtle. This is because ex-
ponential de Finetti theorems do in general not hold in
infinite-dimensional systems [12], but only under addi-
tional assumptions [13]. It is often argued that, using
these results, much of the DV theory can be transferred
to CV systems. Unfortunately, this approach provides
only pessimistic finite-key rate estimates.
Recently, a more direct approach to prove DV QKD
secure against coherent attacks was presented in [14],
which is based on an entropic uncertainty relation with
quantum side information for smooth entropies [15]. This
uncertainty relation gives a bound on Eve’s information
about Alice’s measurement outcomes in terms of the cor-
relation between Alice and Bob. The relation between
security in QKD and uncertainty relations has also been
employed in [16, 17]. Based on the recent extension of
the smooth entropy formalism to the infinite-dimensional
setting [8, 18], it is the objective of this letter to apply
the above reasoning to an entanglement based CV pro-
tocol using two-mode squeezed vacuum states measured
via homodyne detection.
Security Definition and Key Rates.—A generic QKD
protocol between two honest parties, Alice (A) and Bob
(B) either aborts or outputs a key which consists of
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2strings SA and SB on Alice’s and Bob’s side, respectively.
We denote by E the information which is wiretapped dur-
ing the run of the protocol by an attack on the quantum
channel. For CV systems this is modeled on an infinite-
dimensional Hilbert space. The state of SA and E can
be described as a classical quantum state
ωSAE =
∑
s
|s〉〈s| ⊗ ωsE , (1)
where ωsE are states on Eve’s system. Three requirements
have to be fulfilled by an ideal protocol: correctness, se-
crecy and robustness. Correctness is achieved when the
output on Alice’s and Bob’s side agree, SA = SB . Secrecy
of a key means that SA is uniformly distributed and inde-
pendent of E and thus given by ωidSAE = τSA ⊗ σE , with
τSA the uniform mixture of keys, and σE an arbitrary
state on the E system. A protocol is called secure if it is
both correct and secret. Finally, we call an ideal protocol
robust if it never aborts when Eve is passive.
In reality, we can only hope to achieve an almost ideal
protocol. For small parameters c, s and an abortion
probability pabort, we require that the protocol is c-
correct, i.e. Pr[SA 6= SB ] ≤ c, and that the protocol is
s-secret, i.e. (1− pabort) infσ 12‖ωSAE − τSA ⊗ σE‖ ≤ s.
Note that a protocol which always aborts is secure. Thus
we may impose an additional requirement on the robust-
ness, e.g., pabort < 1. This security definition also ensures
that the protocol is secure in the framework of compos-
able security [4], in which different cryptographic proto-
cols can be combined without compromising the overall
security. We note that this is not the case for security
definitions that require only a small mutual information
between the eavesdropper and the key [19].
The measurement step of a QKD protocol produces a
pair of raw keys, XA and XB , held by Alice and Bob. If
the protocol does not abort, the secret keys SA and SB
are extracted using classical error correction and privacy
amplification schemes. We do not discuss the error cor-
rection scheme here and simply assume that it will leak
leakEC bits of information about the key to the eaves-
dropper. The correctness is checked using a hash func-
tion evaluated on both resulting strings which leads to
an additional leakage of order O(log 1c ) [14].
In the privacy amplification step, two-universal hash
functions are used to compress the raw key to a final
length of ` bits. Roughly speaking, this reduces Eve’s
knowledge about Alice’s key by N−` bits. Hence, choos-
ing ` sufficiently small ensures that Eve has no informa-
tion about the resulting bit strings and the key is in-
dependent of E. Formally, Eve’s uncertainty (or lack of
knowledge) is measured in terms of the probability that
she can guess Alice’s raw key XA, i.e. the conditional
min-entropy Hmin(XA|E) (see Appendix A for a formal
definition). In particular, the resulting key is s-secret
if [3, 8, 20]
` . Hmin(XA|E)ω − leakEC −O(log
1
sc
) , (2)
where  ∝ s/pabort. Here, the smooth min-entropy,
Hmin(XA|E), is the optimization of the min-entropy over
states which are  close to ωXAE , where ωXAE denotes
the joint state prior to the classical post-processing con-
ditioned on the event that the protocol does not abort.
We derive lower bounds on this entropy for the following
protocol.
The Protocol.— The analysis of coherent and collective
attacks can widely be treated in parallel. We consider a
trusted source located in Alice’s lab that produces an en-
tangled state by mixing two squeezed vacuum states on a
balanced beam splitter. We assume that each beam con-
sists of only one bosonic mode. Alice sends one beam to
Bob whereupon both perform a homodyne measurement.
They choose uniformly at random between two canoni-
cally conjugated quadrature observables, amplitude and
phase, such that Alice’s and Bob’s outcomes are maxi-
mally correlated whenever their choice agree. In the case
of collective attacks they additionally perform measure-
ments to estimate the covariance matrix. We further as-
sume that the states generated by the source have tensor
product form and that the probability that Alice mea-
sures an amplitude or phase quadrature is larger than
α (~ = 1) is bounded by pα. This is possible since the
source is trusted and located in Alice’s lab.
After all measurements are performed, the two parties
reveal their measurement choices. In the case of coherent
attacks, they discard the data in which they have mea-
sured different quadratures ending up with a string of
N measurement results. Then, they divide the continu-
ous outcome range of the quadrature measurements into
intervals (−∞,−α+δ], (−α+δ,−α + 2δ], . . . , (α−δ,∞)
where we assume for simplicity that 2α/δ ∈ N. We
denote the outcome alphabet by X = {1, 2, ..., 2α/δ}.
A random sample XpeA , X
pe
B ∈ X k of length k are used
for parameter estimation, in which they check the qual-
ity of their correlation by computing the average dis-
tance d(XpeA , X
pe
B ) =
1
k
∑k
i=1 |XpeA,i −XpeB,i| where XpeA =
(XpeA,i)
k
i=1 andX
pe
B = (X
pe
B,i)
k
i=1. If d(X
pe
A , X
pe
B ) is smaller
than d0 they proceed and otherwise they abort the pro-
tocol. In case the test is passed, they use the remain-
ing data XA, XB ∈ Xn (n = N − k) as the raw key
and execute the error correction and privacy amplifica-
tion protocol as discussed in the paragraph before. For
collective attacks, the strings XA ∈ Xn and XB ∈ Xn
are generated as for coherent attacks but the remaining
data (before the binning) is used to estimate the covari-
ance matrix. This also includes the one in which Alice
and Bob measured different quadratures.
Analysis for Coherent Attacks.— The goal is to bound
the smooth min-entropy conditioned on the event that
the protocol does not abort. For that we use an infinite-
dimensional version of the entropic uncertainty relation
for smooth entropies with side information [8], combin-
ing the uncertainty principle for complementary measure-
ments with monogamy of entanglement. It states that
Eve’s information about the measurement outcomes XA
can be bounded by using the the complementary of the
3measurements and the correlation between XA and XB .
In particular, if Alice and Bob are highly correlated after
measuring e.g., the phase quadrature, then Eve’s knowl-
edge about the outcome of the amplitude measurement
is nearly zero, since the observables are maximally com-
plementary. We measure this correlation strength by the
smooth max-entropy Hmax(XA|XB), which characterizes
the amount of information Alice has to send Bob to re-
trieve XA. This leads to the bound (see Appendix B)
Hmin(XA|E)ω ≥ n log
1
c(δ)
−H′max(XA|XB)ω , (3)
where c(δ) is the overlap of the two conjugated quadra-
ture measurements on an interval of length δ which is
well approximated by c(δ) ≈ δ2/(2pi) for small δ. Equa-
tion (3) assumes a uniformly random choice of measure-
ment settings. Since projectors onto intervals (−∞,−α]
and [α,∞) would lead to a trivial state-independent un-
certainty relation, the probability of this event has to be
estimated using pα. In equation 3 this is included in the
change of the smoothing parameter from  to ′.
This reduces the problem to upper bounding the
smooth max-entropy between XA and XB , which can be
done by n·log γ(d(XA, XB)), where γ is a function arising
from a large deviation consideration (see Appendix C).
Using sampling theory, the quantity d(XA, XB) can then,
with high probability, be estimated by d(XpeA , X
pe
B ) plus
a correction µ, which quantifies its statistical deviation
to d(XA, XB) and depends on pα, k and n. Since the pro-
tocol aborts if d(XpeA , X
pe
B ) > d0, we obtain the following
formula for the key length: For parameters k, pα, δ, d0,
an s-secret key of length
` = n[log
1
c(δ)
− log γ(d0 + µ)]− leakEC −O(log 1
sc
) .
can be extracted.
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FIG. 1: Key rate `/N against coherent attacks for an input
squeezing/antisqueezing of 11dB/16dB and additional sym-
metric losses of 0% (solid line), 10% (dashed line) and 20%
(dash-dotted line). For the chosen security parameters see the
main text.
We assume that the source in Alice’s lab is trusted and
that her measurement device is described by projections
onto two canonical variables. Note that the measure-
ment device on Bob’s side need not to be trusted, except
that measurements on different signals commute. Hence,
the additional reference signal (local oscillator) used by
Bob for homodyne detection is covered by our security
analysis. Placing the trusted source in Alice’s lab also
implies that the analysis is not compatible with reverse
reconciliation.
We calculate the correlation between XA and XB un-
der the assumption of an identically and independently
distributed source producing states with an input squeez-
ing of 11dB and antisqueezing of 16dB. Squeezing at this
level has been realized in an experiment at 1550nm [21].
Our noise model consists of loss and excess noise, where
the latter is set to be 1% as it is mainly due to the classi-
cal data acquisition (see Appendix D). The leakage term
is estimated assuming an error correction efficiency of
0.95 [22]. In Fig. 1 the resulting key rates `/N are plot-
ted for different symmetric losses. We have set security
parameters s = c = 10−6. The optimization over the
other free parameters is done numerically for each N .
Typical values for N = 109 are k = 108, α = 52 and
δ = 0.01.
Analysis for Collective Attacks— Under the assump-
tion of collective attacks, the state between Alice, Bob,
and Eve has tensor product structure, ω⊗NABE , enabling
statistical estimations of the covariance matrix of ωAB .
However, we do not cover the statistical details here
and simply introduce confidence sets Cpe , which ensure
that whenever the protocol does not abort the covari-
ance matrix ΓAB of ωAB lies in Cpe with probability at
least 1 − pe. Hence, we have to give a lower bound on
the smooth min-entropy Hmin(XA|E)ω⊗n over all states
with a covariance matrix ΓAB ∈ Cpe . The smooth min-
entropy is evaluated on the classical quantum state ωXAE
which is obtained from ωAB by taking a purification
ωABE and applying the discretized quadrature measure-
ment on the A system.
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FIG. 2: Key rate `/N against collective Gaussian attacks for
losses of 0% (solid line), 15% (dashed line), 25% (dash-dotted
line). Squeezing strength and security parameters are chosen
as in the case of coherent attacks.
We employ the quantum equipartition property of
the smooth min-entropy [23] for infinite-dimensional sys-
tems [18], stating that for large n, Hmin(XA|E)ω⊗n
approaches the conditional von Neumann entropy
4H(XA|E)ω. More precisely, we have
Hmin(XA|E)ω⊗n ≥ n ·H(XA|E)ω −
√
n ·∆ , (4)
where ∆ is a function of , δ and α (see Appendix E).
Using that the minimum of H(XA|E)ω over all states
with a fixed covariance matrix ΓAB is attained for the
corresponding Gaussian state ωΓAB (see Appendix F and
[24]), we get the following formula for the key length.
For parameters k, α, δ, an (s+pe)-secret key of length
n · inf
Γ∈Cpe
H(XA|E)ωΓ −
√
n ·∆− leakEC −O(log 1
sc
)
can be extracted assuming collective attacks.
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FIG. 3: Key rate versus losses secure against coherent attacks
at N = 109 (dot-dashed line), collective Gaussian attacks
at N = 109 (dashed line), and the Devetak-Winter rate [7]
for perfect information reconciliation (solid line). Squeezing
strength and security parameters are chosen as in the case of
coherent attacks.
To evaluate this finite-key bound numerically, we need
explicit expressions for the confidence sets. For this, we
use results from [9], which assume collective Gaussian
attacks. We computed the key rates `/N in Fig. 2 for the
same squeezing strength and loss model as in the case of
coherent attacks. The detailed calculation ofH(XA|E)ωΓ
can be found in Appendix G. For simplicity, we assumed a
constant binning of δ over the entire outcome range (α =
∞). In contrast to the case of coherent attacks, reverse
reconciliation is possible and can increase the key rate
essentially if asymmetric losses are assumed (which we do
not discuss here). In Fig. 3, we plotted the key rate for
coherent and collective Gaussian attacks in dependence
of the losses, and compare them with the Devetak-Winter
rate [7, 8] for perfect error correction.
Discussion and Outlook.—We provided a finite-key se-
curity analysis for a continuous variable QKD protocol
and obtain a composable secure positive key rate against
coherent attacks for experimentally feasible parameters.
The comparison with the finite-key rate against collective
attacks shows that the gap is relatively small compared
to the finite-size effects. This is due to the fact that
the uncertainty relation is almost tight for the two-mode
squeezed states. The reason that the key rates allow
for only small amounts of losses is because of the direct
reconciliation in the error correction protocol. Hence,
an extension of the proof technique against coherent at-
tacks to a reverse reconciliation error correction protocol
would be desirable. In order to relax the assumptions in
the security proof against coherent attacks, it would be
interesting to study the overlap for more realistic mod-
els of the quadrature measurements, which may include
a continuum of modes. Moreover, our arguments might
also be applicable to other CV QKD schemes [25, 26].
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Appendix A: Smooth Min- and Max-Entropies
For the sake of completeness, we give here a formal defi-
nition of the smooth conditional min- and max-entropies
and present the basic properties used in the following.
For a detailed discussion consult e.g. [23, 27, 28] for
the finite-dimensional case and [8, 18] for the infinite-
dimensional case. In the following, H always denotes
a separable Hilbert space and S(H) the state space as-
sociated to H, which consists of all positive semi-definite
trace class operators on H with trace 1. Furthermore, we
define S≤(H) to be the set of all non-normalized states,
that is, positive semi-definite trace class operators with
trace smaller or equal to 1. We indicate different subsys-
tems by labels and denote a state on HAB = HA⊗HB by
ωAB and its reduced state on HA simply by ωA. Classical
systems are denoted by X,Y, Z and are described by em-
bedding the classical degrees of freedom into a Hilbert
space w.r.t. a fixed orthonormal basis. This allows to
read the following definitions for quantum as well as clas-
sical systems.
Definition 1. For ωAB ∈ S≤(HAB), we define the min-
entropy of A conditioned on B as
Hmin(A|B)ω = sup
σB∈S(B)
sup{λ ∈ R|ωAB ≤ 2−λ1IA⊗σB} .
The min-entropy of a classical-quantum state ωXB
characterizes the optimal guessing probability of the clas-
sical variable X given the quantum system B [27].
The purified distance between two states ω, ρ ∈
S≤(H) is defined [28] as P(ω, ρ) =
√
1− F (ω, ρ) where
F (ω, ρ) =
(
tr(|√ω√ρ|) + √(1− tr[σ])(1− tr[ρ]))2 de-
notes the generalized fidelity.
5Definition 2. For ωAB ∈ S≤(HAB) and  ≥ 0, we define
the -smooth min-entropy of A conditioned on B as
Hmin(A|B)ω = supHmin(A|B)ω˜ . (A1)
where the supremum is taken over all ω˜AB ∈ S≤(HAB)
with P(ωAB , ω˜AB) ≤ . The -smooth max-entropy of A
conditioned on B is defined as
Hmax(A|B)ω = −Hmin(A|C)ω . (A2)
where ωABC is an arbitrary purification of ωAB.
One can show that the definition of the smooth max-
entropy is independent of the choice of the purification.
As for the min-entropy, we denote the non-smoothed ver-
sion ( = 0) of the max-entropy simply by Hmax(A|B)ω.
The smooth max-entropy can also be expressed as the
optimization of the max-entropy over -close states, that
is,
Hmax(A|B)ω = inf Hmax(A|B)ω˜ , (A3)
where the infimum is taken over all ω˜AB ∈ S≤(HAB)
with P(ωAB , ω˜AB) ≤ . These entropies satisfy the data
processing inequality saying that whenever the system B
is manipulated with a quantum operation E : S(HB) →
S(HC), the entropy can only increase
Hmin (A|B)ω ≤ Hmin (A|C)idA⊗E(ω) (A4)
Hmax (A|B)ω ≤ Hmax (A|C)idA⊗E(ω) . (A5)
Appendix B: Derivation of the Uncertainty Relation
Let us assume that the protocol parameters α and δ are
fixed. For simplicity, we further assume that M := 2α/δ
is in N. In the protocol Alice and Bob both measure
the projectors of the quadrature measurements on the
intervals I1 = (−∞,−α + δ], I2 = (−α + δ,−α + 2δ],
..., IM = (α − δ,∞). Let us denote the corresponding
outcome alphabet by X = {1, 2, , ...,M}, which by def-
inition is of size |X | = 2α/δ. Let us introduce another
partition of R into intervals {I˜k}k∈N of equal length δ
such that I˜k = Ik for k ∈ X\{1,M}. In the following we
denote the projection onto the interval I of the spectrum
of the phase and amplitude operator of Alice by QA(I)
and PA(I).
We can assume that they first distribute all the sub-
systems on which they perform the measurements. Let
us denote the state shared between Alice, Bob and Eve
on which they produce the sifted N measurements by
ωANBNE , where N denotes the number of subsystems.
In the parameter estimation step they check that the av-
erage distance of the random sample of k measurements
XpeA , X
pe
B ∈ X k satisfies
d(XpeA , X
pe
B ) ≤ d0. (B1)
Note that this test can be written as a projector Πpassk
which only acts non-trivially on the k subsystems used
in the parameter step. If this condition holds, they pur-
sue with the protocol otherwise they abort. Let us de-
note by ωAnBnE the quantum state on the remaining n
subsystems conditioned on the event that the parameter
estimation test passes.
Alice chooses now for each subsystem uniform at ran-
dom between phase and amplitude measurements. This
can be modeled by introducing a random variable Zn =
(Z1, ..., Zn) independently and identically distributed ac-
cording to the uniform distribution, where Zi takes val-
ues 0 or 1 depending on whether Alice measures phase
or amplitude in the ith run. Let us denote the uniform
distribution over Zn = {0, 1}n by u and by {|zn〉}zn∈Zn
an orthonormal basis of a Hilbert space. The random
measurement choice of Alice can now be modeled by in-
troducing the state
ωZnAnBnE =
∑
zn∈Zn
u(zn)|zn〉〈zn| ⊗ ωAnBnE , (B2)
and the positive operator valued measure (POVM)
{ΠlnA (zn) ⊗ |zn〉〈zn|}zn∈Zn,ln∈Xn acting on An and Zn,
where
Πl
n
A (z
n) =
⊗
i
Π
lni
A (z
n
i ) , (B3)
with ΠiA(0) = QA(Ii) and Π
i
A(1) = PA(Ii) for i ∈ X .
Hence, zni determines whether phase or quadrature is
measured. Let us denote the post-measurement state ob-
tained by measuring the state ωAnBnEZn by the POVM
{Πkn(zn)⊗|zn〉〈zn|} by ωnXABnEZn . Here, XA takes val-
ues in X k and denotes the random variable which de-
scribes the distribution of the keys. Note that all parties
are assumed to hold a copy of the variable Z since the
measurement choices have been revealed in the sifting
phase. Additionally, we introduce a similar POVM for
the projections onto the spectrum of Alice’s phase and
amplitude measurements onto the intervals {I˜i}i∈N and
denote them by
Π˜l
n
A (z
n) =
⊗
i
Π˜liA(zi) , (B4)
where Π˜iA(0) = QA(I˜i) and Π˜
i
A(1) = PA(I˜i) for i ∈ N.
The corresponding post-measurement state is denoted by
ω˜nXABnEZn . Note that here the distribution over XA can
take values in Nn.
The main idea in the security proof is to apply an
uncertainty relation with quantum side information for
the smooth min- and max-entropy [15]. For that, it is
important that the measurement are maximally comple-
mentary. In the case of the POVM {Πkn(zn)⊗ |zn〉〈zn|}
this is a problem since the projectors of the phase and
amplitude measurements onto the big intervals I1 for
i = 1,M almost commute. The idea is now that by
trusting the source, we can estimate the (purified) dis-
tance between the states ωnXABEZn and ω˜
n
XABEZn
. For
the state ω˜nXABEZn , we can then obtain a non-trivial un-
certainty relation since all projectors have only support
6on an interval of length δ. In particular, it follows that
Hmin (XA|EZn)ω˜ ≥ −n log c−Hmax (XA|BnZn)ω˜ (B5)
where c = supi,j ‖
√
QA(I˜i)
√
PA(I˜j)‖2. The inequality in
this form is proven for the finite-dimensional case in [29,
Corollary 7.6]. The generalization to infinite dimensions
is straightforward by using the techniques from [8]. It
turns out the the overlap c only depends on the length
of the intervals and is given by
c(δ) =
δ2
2pi
· S(1)0 (1,
δ2
4
)2 ,
where S(1)n (·, u) denotes the radial prolate spheroidal
wave function of the first kind (see [30] and references
therein).
In a next step, we estimate the distance between
ωnXABEZ and ω˜
n
XABEZ . According to the main text, we
assume that the source produces a state which is inde-
pendently and identically for each run. That is, the state
has tensor product form ωAN = ω⊗NA . Furthermore, if we
set p¯α = 1 − pα we have by assumption that the source
satisfies
tr
[
ωAQA([−α, α])
]
≥ p¯α, (B6)
as well as tr
[
ωAPA([−α, α])
] ≥ p¯α. Let us now define
Λ = N\X and for every zn ∈ [0, 1]n the projector
ΠΛA(z
n) =
∑
ln∈Λ
Π˜l
n
A (z
n) (B7)
which corresponds to the event where at least one of the
quadrature measurements exceeds α. Since
ωAn =
1
ppass
trAkBN
(
Πpassk ωANBN
)
≤ 1
ppass
ω⊗nA
with ppass = 1− pabort, we obtain for every zn ∈ Zn
tr
[
ωAnΠ
Λ
A(z
n)
]
≤ 1− p¯
n
α
ppass
. (B8)
We can now bound the fidelity for a fixed zn ∈ Zn by
F (ωz
n
XABnE , ω˜
zn
XABnE) ≥ (1− tr
[
ωAnΠ
Λ
A(z
n)
]
)2
≥ 1− 2 tr
[
ωAnΠ
Λ
A(z
n)
]
≥ 1− 21− p¯
n
α
ppass
,
where ωz
n
XABnE
and ω˜z
n
XABnE
denote the normalized states
conditioned on the event zn. Since now the fidelity be-
tween ωnXABnEZn and ω˜
n
XABnEZn
is just the average over
zn ∈ Zn, we obtain by the definition of the purified dis-
tance (see Section A)
P(ωnXABnEZn , ω˜nXABnEZn) ≤
f(n, pα)√
ppass
, (B9)
where f(pα, n) =
√
2(1− (1− pα)n).
The bound in (B9) can now be used to bound the
smooth min- and max-entropy by
H+˜min(XA|EZn)ω ≥ Hmin(XA|EZn)ω˜
−H+˜′max (XA|BnZn)ω˜ ≥ −Hmax(XA|BnZn)ω ,
where ˜ = f(pα, n)/
√
ppass. We simply used the Defini-
tion 2 and the fact that the purified distance can only
decrease by tracing out a subsystem. In combination
with the uncertainty relation in (B5), we arrive at
H+2˜min (XA|EZn)ω ≥ −n log c(δ)−Hmax(XA|BnZn)ω .
Applying the data processing inequality to the max-
entropy Hmax(XA|BnZn)ω ≤ Hmax(XA|XB)ω, we ob-
tain the final uncertainty relation used in Equation (3)
in the main text. Note that we assumed in the main text
that Zn is included in E.
Appendix C: Statistical Analysis for Coherent
Attacks
The goal is to show that if the protocol does not abort
and thus, satisfies d(XpeA , X
pe
B ) ≤ d0, the smooth max-
entropy in Equation (3) can be bounded by
H
′
max(XA|XB)ω ≤ n log γ(d0 + µ0) , (C1)
where
γ(t) = (t+
√
1 + t2)
( t√
1 + t2 − 1
)t
,
and
µ0 = |X |
√
N(k + 1)
nk2
log
1
s/4− 2f(pα, n) . (C2)
Note that the alphabet X satisfies |X | = d2αδ e and
′ = s/(4ppass) − 2f(pα, n)/√ppass [37]. The proof
is divided into two steps and follows closely the argu-
ments in [14]. First we derive a bound on the smooth
max-entropy, and then we estimate the probability that
d(XA, XB) ≥ d(XpeA , XpeB ) + µ.
Proposition 1. Let X be a finite alphabet, P(x, x′) a
probability distribution on Xn × Xn for some n ∈ N,
d0 > 0 and  > 0. If P satisfies PrP[d(x, x′) ≥ d0] ≤ 2,
then
Hmax (X|X ′)P ≤ n log γ(d0) ,
where
γ(t) = (t+
√
1 + t2)
(
t/[
√
1 + t2 − 1]
)t
.
7Proof. We first note that the smooth max-entropy is ob-
tained by taking the infimum over non-smooth max-
entropies of all states which are -close in purified dis-
tance (A3). Let us define the probability distribution
Q(x, x′) =
{
P(x,x′)
PrP[d(x,x′)≤d0] , if d(x, x
′) ≤ d0
0, else
and note that F (P,Q) = PrP[d(x, x′) ≤ d0]. Hence, it fol-
lows that P(P,Q) = √PrP[d(x, x′) ≥ d0] ≤ . Using that
the 0-Rényi-entropy is bigger than the max-entropy [20],
we obtain
Hmax (X|X ′)P ≤ Hmax (X|X ′)Q ≤ H0(X|X ′)Q .
The conditional 0-Rényi entropy of the distribution Q is
then given by [3, Remark 3.1.4]
H0(X|X ′)Q = max
x′
log |{x ∈ Xn ; Q(x, x′) 6= 0}|
≤ log |{x ∈ Zn ;
n∑
i=1
|xi| ≤ nd0}| .
For any λ > 0 we estimate
|{x ∈ Zn ;
n∑
i=1
|xi| ≤ nd0}| ≤
∑
x∈Zn
exp[λ(nd0 −
n∑
i=1
|xi|)]
= eλnd0
(∑
z∈Z
e−λ|z|
)n
=
(
eλd0
1 + e−λ
1− e−λ
)n
.
By optimizing over λ > 0, one finds that |{x ∈
Zn ;
∑n
i=1 |xi| ≤ nd0}| ≤ γ(d0)n. This completes the
proof.
Now, we have to estimate the probability that
d(XA, XB) ≥ d(XpeA , XpeB ) + ν conditioned on the event
that the protocol does not abort. Since the probability
that the protocol passes is ppass, we find according to
Bayes’ theorem that
Pr[d(XA, XB) ≥ d(XpeA , XpeB ) + ν|“pass”]
≤ 1
ppass
Pr[d(XA, XB) ≥ d(XpeA , XpeB ) + ν] .
Deriving a bound on Pr[d((XA, XB) ≥ d(XpeA , XpeB ) + ν]
is a standard problem from random sampling without
replacement. We have that XpeA , X
pe
B ∈ X k is a ran-
dom sample of all measurements XtotA , X
tot
B ∈ XN . The
quantity of interest is |xiA − xiB |, where xiA ∈ XtotA and
xiB ∈ XtotB . For this we denote the population mean
by dtot = d(XtotA , X
tot
B ), the sample mean by dpe =
d(XpeA , X
pe
B ), and for the raw key dkey = d(XA, XB).
Note that these are related via
Ndtot = kdpe + ndkey . (C3)
We consider the runs of the protocol as a probabilistic
process and treat dtot as a random variable. We first use
the bound from [31] to obtain
Pr[dkey ≥ a+ ν|dtot = a] ≤ e−2nν
2 N
|X|2(k+1) ,
which is independent of a. Here, we used that the maxi-
mal value of |xiA − xiB | is given by |X |. Using Eq. (C3),
we can compute
Pr[dkey ≥ dpe + ν] = Pr[dkey ≥ dtot + k
N
ν]
=
∑
a
Pr[dtot = a] · Pr[dkey ≥ a+ k
N
ν|dtot = a]
≤ e−2ν
2 nk2
|X|2N(k+1) .
Hence, together with Proposition 1 and the fact that the
protocol aborts for d(XpeA , X
pe
B ) > d0, we arrive at
Hmax (X|X ′)P ≤ n log γ(d0 + ν)
for
ν = |X |
√
N(k + 1)
nk2
log
1
 · √ppass .
In the protocol, we have to bound the smooth max-
entropy for a smoothing parameter ′ =  = s4ppass −
2f(pα, n)/
√
ppass. Since ppass ≤ 1, we can bound ν ≤ µ
and obtain the bound in Equation (C1).
Appendix D: The Error Model
We consider a symmetric two parameter error model,
using the loss µloss and excess noise µen. The loss is our
main source of noise and is equivalent to replacing a cer-
tain amount of signal by vacuum. The excess noise corre-
sponds to a classical noise added by the data acquisition
system and can in principle be made arbitrary small by
using appropriate equipment. Both effects are gaussian
noise sources and are expressed as action on the covari-
ance matrix by Γ → (1 − µloss)Γ + (µloss + µen)Γvac,
where Γvac denotes the covariance matrix of the vacuum
state.
Appendix E: Asymptotic Equipartition Property
We use [18, Proposition 8], which states that for  >
0, n ≥ 85 log 22 , and any quantum state ωAB for which
H(A)ω is finite, we have
Hmin(A|B)ω⊗n ≥ n ·H(A|B)ω −
√
n·
4 log(2−
1
2Hmin(A|B)ω + 2
1
2Hmax(A|B)ω + 1)
√
log
2
2
.
8In our case, we are interested in the classical quantum
state ωXAE for which H(XA)ω is finite and the formula
applies. Let us now simplify the last term in the above
inequality. Let ωXAEC be an arbitrary purification of
ωXAE , we have according to the definition of the max-
entropy (A2)
−Hmin(XA|E)ω = Hmax(XA|C)ω ≤ Hmax(XA)ω
where the last inequality is due to the data processing
inequality (A5). Furthermore, we can also use the data
processing inequality (A5) to bound the max-entropy
Hmax(XA|E)ω ≤ Hmax(XA)ω. Using this two estima-
tions, we obtain
2−
1
2Hmin(XA|E)ω + 2
1
2Hmax(XA|E)ω ≤ 2 12Hmax(XA)ω+1 .
Hence, we finally arrive at Hmin(XA|E)ω⊗n ≥ n ·
H(XA|E)ω −
√
n ·∆ with
∆ = 4 log(2
1
2Hmax(XA)ω+1 + 1)
√
log
2
2
, (E1)
which is used in (4) of the main paper. Note that ∆
only depends on  and the measurement distribution on
Alice’s side. Since we assume in our setup a known source
in Alice’s lab this can be directly calculated.
Appendix F: Gaussian Extremality
In the following we show that the infimum
infωH(XA|E)ω taken over all states ωAB with covari-
ance matrix Γ is attained for the Gaussian representa-
tive. Even though the argument is in analogy to [24], we
give it here for the sake of completeness. See also [32] for
a similar result.
The main tool is the result from [33] which classifies
functions which are optimized by Gaussian states. In
particular, if one can show that a function f(ωAB) is (i)
lower semi-continuous in trace norm, (ii) invariant under
local unitary transformations, and (iii) strongly superad-
ditive, i.e. f(ωABA′B′) ≥ f(ωAB)+f(ωA′B′) where equal-
ity holds if ωABA′B′ = ωAB ⊗ ωA′B′ , then it follows that
f(ωAB) ≥ f(ωΓAB). Here, ωΓAB denotes the Gaussian rep-
resentative of the family of states with same covariance
matrix Γ.
Consider now the function f(ωAB) = H(X|E)ω where
ωABE is a purification of ωAB and ωXBE is obtained
by applying the measurement used in our protocol on
the A system. The conditional von Neumann entropy
is defined in accordance with [34], that is, H(A|B)ρ =
H(A)ρ−H(ρAB ||ρA⊗ρB) where H(ρ||σ) denotes the rel-
ative entropy. In this definition we require that H(A)ρ
is finite. Note that the classical alphabet X on which
ωX is defined is finite such that H(X)ω is always fi-
nite and the conditional entropy is well-defined. Be-
cause 0 ≤ H(X|B)ρ ≤ H(X)ρ ≤ log |X | holds for any
finite-dimensional B systems, we obtain the same re-
sult for infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces via the finite-
dimensional approximation property of the conditional
von Neumann entropy as shown in [34].
We show now that f(ωAB) = H(X|E)ω satisfies the
properties (i)-(iii) from which the extremality of the
Gaussian state follows. The properties (i) and (ii) are ob-
tained in a similar way as in [24]. In order to show prop-
erty (iii) one takes a purification ωABA′B′E of ωABA′B′ ,
which is of course also a purification of ωAB and ωA′B′ .
The following chain of inequalities for the von Neumann
entropies
H(XX|E)ω = H(X|X ′E)ω +H(X ′|XE)ω
+ I(X : X ′|E)ω
≥ H(X|A′B′E) +H(X|ABE)
holds for finite-dimensional systems due to I(X :
X ′|E)ω ≥ 0 and since X (X ′) is obtained from AB
(A′B′) via a trace preserving completely positive map.
But this can be lifted to infinite-dimensions via the finite-
dimensional approximation property [34] as the entropies
are all finite. Hence, we obtain the strong superadditivity
f(ωABA′B′) = H(XX|E)ω
≥ H(X|A′B′E) +H(X|ABE)
= f(ωAB) + f(ωA′B′) .
The equality in the case of ωAB ⊗ωA′B′ follows from the
additivity of the von Neumann entropy.
Appendix G: Calculation of H(XA|E) for Discretized
Measurements
In order to compute the bound on the key length se-
cure against collective attacks as given in the main pa-
per, we have to calculate H(XA|E)ω for a two mode
squeezed Gaussian state ωAB . For the proper definition
and the properties of conditional von Neumann entropies
for infinite-dimensional systems, we refer to [34]. Let
ωABC be a Gaussian purification of ωAB with ωE a two
mode Gaussian state. We first rewrite the entropy as
H(XA|E)ω = H(XAE)ω −H(E)ω
= H(E|XA)ω +H(XA)ω −H(AB)ω ,
where we used that ωABE is pure and therefore H(E) =
H(AB). Note also that in our case the alphabet X is fi-
nite. Since ωAB is a two mode Gaussian state the entropy
H(AB)ω is just a function of the symplectic invariants
and can be calculated [35].
For the computation of the other entropies, we as-
sume for simplicity that the correlations in amplitude
and phase are symmetric, and do the calculation for
the amplitude measurement with corresponding opera-
tor denoted by X. The measurement operators for a
projection onto the interval Ik, k ∈ X , are described
9by Ek = µx(Ik), where µx is the spectral measure of
X. The post-measurement states are then given by
ωkABE = 1/pk(EkωABEE
†
k), where pk = tr [ωABEEk].
The entropy H(XA)ω is the Shannon entropy of the clas-
sical distribution {pk}.
Let us turn to the estimation of H(E|XA)ω. First, we
note that
H(E|XA)ω =
∑
k
pkH(E)ωk ,
which reduces the problem to calculate H(E)ωk for ev-
ery k ∈ X . For that we introduce the normalized post
measurement state ωBE(x) conditioned that Alice mea-
sures the amplitude x ∈ R. Furthermore, we denote
by p(x) the probability that Alice measures x. Since
ωAE is a Gaussian state, one can show that ωE(x) =
U(v(x))ωE(0)U(v(x))
†, where U(v) denotes the Weyl op-
erator which corresponds to a phase space translation and
v is a continuous function which depends on ΓAE . Hence,
we obtain that H(E)ω(x) = H(E)ω(0) for all x.
Proposition 2. Let ωAB be a two mode squeezed Gaus-
sian state, ωABE a Gaussian purification, and ωBE(x)
and ωkBE as defined above. Then, it follows that
H(E)ωk ≥ H(E)ω(0) and, thus, H(E|XA)ω ≥ H(E)ω(0).
Proof. The proof exploits the concavity of the von Neu-
mann entropy and the fact that the state ωkE can be
approximated in trace class by a finite convex com-
bination of states ωE(x). Note that we can write
ωkE = 1/pk
∫
Ik
p(x)ωE(x)dx where the integral converges
weakly. As discussed above we also have the relation
ωE(x) = U(v(x))ωE(0)U(v(x))
†. Since U(v) is strongly
continuous in v, we have x 7→ ωBE(x) and, thus, x 7→
ωE(x) are trace class continuous. Hence, we know that
the Lebesgue integral
∫
Ik
p(x)ωE(x)dx converges even in
trace norm, and furthermore, it is equal to the Riemann
integral. So we can approximate ωkE in trace norm via
step functions
ρlE =
1
pk
Nl∑
j=1
p(xlj)|J lj |ωE(xlj) ,
where it holds for all l that Ik =
⋃
j J
l
j , the xlj ∈ J lj are
chosen such that
∑Nl
j=1 p(x
l
j)|J lj | = pk, and supj |J lj | → 0
for l → ∞. Furthermore, as ωE(x) is a Gaussian
state, we have that for H = Q2E + P
2
E the expecta-
tion value tr [ωE(x)H] is bounded and continuous in
x, so tr
[
ρlEH
] → tr [ωkEH] for l → ∞ [38]. Using
that the von Neumann entropy is continuous for se-
quences of states with finite energy [36], we find that
H(E)ωk = liml→∞H(ρlE), and thus,
H(ωkE) = lim
l→∞
H(ρlE)
≥ lim
l→∞
1
pk
Nl∑
j=1
p(xlj)|J lj |H(ωE(xlj)) = H(ωE(0)) .
The inequality is due to the concavity of the von Neu-
mann entropy [36] and the last equality holds because
H(ωE(x)) is independent of x.
Using this proposition we finally get
H(XA|E)ω ≥ H(E)ω(0) +H(XA)ω −H(AB)ω ,
where the right-hand side can be calculated since ωE(0)
and ωAB are Gaussian states (see [35]). Note that the
only dependence on the interval length δ in this formula
is due to H(XA)ω.
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